For the last three years,
since the launch of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam we have seen numerous
articles that are factually inaccurate and logically flawed. To rebut all such erroneous comments is
difficult, if not impossible, as well as time-wasting.
However, the recent press
release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt entitled "Egypt’s
Perspective towards the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP)"
was one of the few detailed statements from the government of Egypt in the past
three years. Regrettably, it was full of misleading claims and a disappointing
one to all who have been working to bring a regional cooperation based on
mutual benefit and good neighborliness.
Moreover, these kinds of
statements are likely to be used as "reference" by other writers who
may be ignorant or careless of the realities. Therefore, the recent press
release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt deserves a detailed retort.
As we will be show below, the
statement consist mega-errors of facts and flawed arguments.
The statement started
claiming that:
Ten
years ago within the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), the three Eastern Nile
Countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan) jointly agreed to study their national
plan projects through an agreed mechanism which was named the Eastern Nile
Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP). A regional power trade study was conducted,
in which two sites in Ethiopia were identified for potential dam projects,
What happened to the NBI? The
statement doesn't say anything! Indeed, the Nile basin countries, except
Eritrea and South Sudan, founded the Nile Basin Commission, later Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI), in 1999, with funds from World Bank, aiming ‘to establish a
diplomatic protocol for evaluating the fair use of the river for agricultural
and energy projects’. The Commission paved the way for the drafting the ‘Nile
Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), for the equitable sharing of the
Nile waters.
However, the CFA faced
resistance from Egypt; while it was warmly endorsed by six Nile basin countries
from May 2010 up to February 2011 (Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya
and Burundi). Though Congo didn't sign yet, it has expressed its willingness.
As one water expert
eloquently elucidated: “CFA has, however, faced a serious impasse as a result
of the introduction of the concept of ‘water security’. The introduction of
this non-legal, indeterminate, and potentially disruptive concept is, indeed, a
regrettable detour to a virtual blind-alley. The justifications for this
fateful decision are totally unfounded and specious. The decision rather makes
sense as an unwarranted move pushing into further obscurity the already
intractable Nile waters question, at best, and a logical cul-de-sac in the
decade-long negotiations which have arguably fallen prey to the hegemonic
compliance-producing mechanism of ‘securitization’ sneaked in under the veil of
‘water security’, at worst”.
Egypt's statement makes no
comment on this important aspect of the NBI. The statement raised the NBI only
because it wanted to claim that Ethiopia has abruptly departed from it.
However, Ethiopia has been the most loyal of NBI members, even is she has no
legal obligations to. That was with a belief that Egypt will ultimately join
the cooperative framework.
The statement claimed:
Unexpectedly,
and without any prior notification, the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) declared
in February 2011 its intention to construct a new dam on the Blue Nile named
“Project X”. This declaration led the Norwegian government to cancel the
studies of the additional dams due to the unclarity of Ethiopian plans and
preferences.
By the end of April 2011,
Ethiopia announced unilaterally the construction of a large dam on the Blue
Nile called “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” (GERD) with a height of 145 m,
storage capacity of 74 BCM, installing capacity of 6000 MW, and a total cost of
US$ 4.78 billion.
This claim is both
illogical and inaccurate.
In the first place, the
Norwegian study was never interrupted as the dam under study is far away from
the GERD and Norway as a responsible development partner wouldn't cancel
studies for an unrelated reason. In fact, the construction of the Mendeya dam
that was under study will be launched in 2015.
Indeed, few were informed of
the launch of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project until weeks before
its date of launch on April 2, 2011. The government announced it on the media
only weeks earlier. But that doesn't mean cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
projects.
Among the citizens of
Ethiopia, there is no difference of opinion on generating hydro-power from
dams, while harnessing the Blue Nile for national development has been an
aspiration of generations of officials, professionals and ordinary citizens. In
fact, the public's support was demonstrated in the Tana Beles and Tekeze
projects - built on tributaries of Blue Nile. The target of achieving 10,000 MW
generating capacity by 2015 was already endorsed in mid-2010 as part of the
5-years Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). It was also stated on the annual
plan of EEPCO for year 2009/2010, though as labeled "project x"
without reference to Nile.
Having this strong public
mandate on its hands, the question of whether to keep the preparations and
launch date of this project secret or not, is a matter that can justifiably be
determined based on national security considerations. In the 12 months
preceding the launch of the project, Ethiopia was conducting an election, then
forming government, then seeking donor's pledge for the GTP.
With regard to the absence of
notification that the Egyptian statement complained about: Firstly, Ethiopia
has no treaty obligation to seek permissions from Egypt. Second, the impacts of
dams on downstream countries have been a subject of study and discussion for
at-least a decade in the context of successive Nile basin initiatives and
annual conferences.
Thirdly, and no less
importantly, prior notification is an act of good will gesture based on
reciprocity. As Egypt never consulted Ethiopia on studies prior and after
building dams and related projects on Nile, it cannot demand that from
Ethiopia. After all, reciprocity is a fundamental component international
relations as well as social life.
The statement has more
incomprehensible claims. It said:
Ethiopian officials
claimed at the beginning that the downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) would
not be harmed and in fact would benefit from the project. However, these
statements were then changed gradually to reflect the recognition of the GOE
that the dam would have impacts on the downstream countries, but that those
impacts would be mitigated and compensated through water saving projects in
South Sudan.
In the first place, as the
Egyptian have learnt from the disastrous Aswan dam project, human endeavors
are, unlike God's work, are not immune from negative impacts. Therefore, no one
said the GERD is a God's work. For example: Ethiopia had to relocate a few
dozen households from the GERD site. That is an impact.
However, the question is
whether those impacts can be mitigated and avoided with careful planning and
cooperative regional work. In line with that whether the benefits outweigh those
mitigation works. The answer is a bold YES.
As the former Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi said during the launch of the dam, "the benefits that will
accrue from the Dam will by no means be restricted to Ethiopia. They will
clearly extend to all neighboring states, and particularly to the downstream
Nile basin countries, to Sudan and Egypt. The Dam will greatly reduce the
problems of silt and sediment that consistently affect dams in Egypt and Sudan.
This has been a particularly acute problem at Sudan’s Fosseiries dam which has
been experienced reduction in output. When the Dam becomes operational,
communities all along the riverbanks and surrounding areas, particularly in
Sudan, will be permanently relieved from centuries of flooding. These countries
will have the opportunity to obtain increased power supplies at competitive
prices. The Dam will increase the amount of water resources available, reducing
the wastage from evaporation which has been a serious problem in these
countries. It will in fact ensure a steady year-round flow of the Nile. This,
in turn, should have the potential to amicably resolve the differences which
currently exist among riparian states over the issue of equitable utilization
of the resource of the Nile water."
"In other words, the Millennium
Dam will not only provide benefits to Ethiopia. It will also offer mutually
beneficial opportunities to Sudan and to Egypt. Indeed, one might expect these
countries to be prepared to share the cost in proportion to the gains that each
state will derive. On this calculation, Sudan might offer to cover 30 per cent
and Egypt 20 per cent of the costs of the entire project."
Similarly, the International
Panel of Experts attested in its final report (which is a consensus report
signed by the representatives of the three countries Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan
and the four international experts), that the design and construction of the
Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam is based on international design criteria and
standards, codes, guidelines and engineering practices. Moreover, it
re-confirmed that the GERD does not have significant impact on the downstream
countries and in fact will provide huge benefits to all the three riparian
countries, namely Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.
The statement claimed:
Former Prime Minister, Dr.
Essam Sharaf, Prime Minister of Egypt at the time, agreed with the late
Ethiopian Prime Minister “Meles Zinawi” during an official visit to Addis Ababa
in May 2011, to establish an International Panel of Experts (IPOE), composed of
two National members from each of the three countries, in addition to four
international experts, in order to provide sound review/assessment of the
potential impacts of the project on the two downstream countries, and any
associated benefits to be expected.
Egypt's statement
went further to misrepresent the final report of the International Panel of
Experts.
In truth, it was upon
the initiation and invitation of the government of Ethiopia that the
International Panel of Experts (IPoE) was established. Moreover, Ethiopia has
also shown its commitment by accepting the report of the IPoE and is
implementing the recommendations that are related to dam engineering and safety
in a timely manner and agreed to jointly conduct the two studies recommended by
the IPoE.
The Egyptian
statement deliberately omits an important element of the agreement establishing
the Internal Panel of Experts, that the study should be conducted while the
construction continued. It also ignores the fact that the Panel outlined the
benefits accruing from the Dam, benefits that were consonant with Ethiopia’s
own studies.
As the response from
Ethiopia's Foreign Ministry pointed out: Egypt's statement, apparently
deliberately, falsifies the findings of the International Panel of Experts. In
the first place, the allegation that Ethiopia denied documents to the Panel
members is untrue and the Panel nowhere suggests this occurred. Nor is it true
that Ethiopia deliberately delayed the completion of design documents until
after the launch of the Panel’s report. This claim shows complete ignorance of
the process involved. The nature of the Engineering Procurement and
Construction contract makes preparation of the design documents a
phase-by-phase undertaking. Ethiopia, as indeed the Panel recommended, has finalized
the updating of the design documents from level one to level two as the project
progressed and in line with the EPC contract. In any case, this had no
relevance to the Panel’s studies of the design documents and had no effect on
the discharge of its mandate. Indeed, the Panel’s report unequivocally
confirmed that the design of the GERD fulfilled international standards on
dams.
The comment that the
Panel’s findings suggested that the Hydrological and Reservoir Simulation Study
showed “detrimental impacts on Egypt’s water demand and High Aswan Dam
Hydropower generation” is a serious distortion. In fact, the study is praised
by the Panel for meeting international standards and the Panel had no issue
with its findings. The reason the Panel recommended a further simulation study
was in order for the three parties to conduct a study with a simulation model
that all three parties agreed on. The socio-economic study was also recommended
in order to add further primary data collected from Egypt and Sudan.
The narrative of the
trilateral ministerial meeting on Egypt's statement was similarly detached from
reality. In the meetings, Egypt’s suggestion was to create a new Panel of
Experts, parallel to that already agreed upon, that is a second panel of
experts to review the report of the first panel for the ministers. This was
seen by both the Sudan and Ethiopia as unreasonable and unnecessary.
Over and above this was the
additional outrageous Egyptian demand that the opinions of new panel of
international experts should be binding as if it was an arbitration tribunal.
This was totally unacceptable and Ethiopia, of course, rejected it and
continues to do so. The Egyptian suggestion for “Principles of Confidence
Building” was totally out of agenda in a meeting to discuss the Panel’s
recommendations, and the “principles” which involved requesting Ethiopia to
accept Egypt’s claims for water security, were rejected by Ethiopia – and
strongly criticized by the Sudan.
The Egyptian Ministry
complains that the Water Ministers’ meeting to consider the recommendations of
the Panel was delayed and regrets continuation of the construction of the dam
during this. In fact, according the report itself, the Panel’s recommendations
were to be implemented while the construction of the dam continued. As regard,
complaint over delays in the Water Ministers’ meeting, this had nothing to do
with Ethiopia. Following the June 18 visit of the then Foreign Minister of
Egypt, Mohamed Kemal Amr, to Addis Ababa it was agreed to hold a meeting of the
Water Ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to discuss ways to implement the
recommendations of the Panel as soon as possible. It was at that point that
President Morsi was removed and Egypt fell into political turmoil, and
presumably as a result there was no response to the invitation, sent on July
26, for a meeting on August 6. A second invitation was sent on August 26. Egypt
finally responded to agree to a meeting for October 20. This, however, did not
materialize due to the unfortunate flooding in Khartoum. It was not until
November that the first session of the Water Ministers’ meeting eventually took
place. The delays were nothing to do with Ethiopia.
As Ethiopia repeatedly
urged, it is in the interest of all concerned countries that Egypt changes
course and engages in discussions in good faith rather than aiming at
short-sighted propaganda.
Ethiopia's commitment to
mutual benefit and good neighborliness is not a knee-jerk decision rather an
outcome a scientific, prudent and developmental foreign policy.
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